HomeMy WebLinkAbout03-28-2008 Thomas B. Binford vs. City of Winter SpringsFtCEIVED
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BROWN, GARGANESE, WEISS & UAGREST4�-�FA� E TY CLERK
Debra S. Babb-Nutcher"
Joseph E. Blitch
Usher L. Brown'
Suzanne D'Agresta"
Anthony A. Garganese"
J.W. Taylor
Jeffrey S. Weiss
'Board Certified Civil Trial Lawyer
"Board Certified City, County & Local Government Law
'Board Certified Appellate Practice
Attorneys at Law
Offices in Orlando, Kissimmee, Cocoa,
Ft. Lauderdale & Tampa
March 28, 2008
Andrea Lorenzo-Luaces, City Clerk
City of Winter Springs
1126 East State Road 434
Winter Springs, Florida 32708
Re: Thomas B. Binford vs. City of Winter Springs
Dear Andrea:
Tara L. Barrett
Vivian P. Cocotas
Scott J. Dornstein
Robin Gibson Drage
Mitchell B. Haller
Katherine W. Latorre
Terri E. Oster
Amy J. Pitsch
Erin J. O'Leary'
Catherine D. Reischmann"
William E. Reischmann, Jr.
Of Counsel
Please find enclosed for your records, the Order Granting Final Summary Judgment
on First Amendment and Final Judgment.
Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to me.
Very ruly yours,
Jennette Farris
Assistant to Anthony A. Garganese
/jf
Enclosure
225 East Robinson Street, Suite 660 • P.O. Box 2873 -Orlando, Florida 32802-2873
Orlando (407) 425-9566 Fax (407) 425-9596 - Kissimmee (321) 402-0144 - Cocoa (866) 425-9566 - Ft. Lauderdale (954) 670-1979
Website: www.orlandolaw.net - Email: firm@orlandolaw.net
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN
AND FOR SEMINOLE COUNTY
CASE NO: 05-CA-367-16-W
THOMAS A. BINFORD,
Plaintiff,
vs
CITY OF WINTER SPRINGS, a Florida
municipality
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON FIRST AMENDMENT
AND FINAL JUDGMENT
On February 28, 2008, this matter came on for hearing before this Court on remand
from the Fifth District Court of Appeal for this Court to consider Plaintiffs argument in
Paragraph 7 of his previously filed Affidavit in opposition to the City's previously filed and
heard Motion for Summary Judgment on the First Amendment issues. The Court having
reviewed the Plaintiffs Affidavit and the City's Response, and having heard arguments of
Plaintiff and counsel for the City, the Court makes the following FINDINGS:
1. Based on a plain reading of the written opinions from the Fifth District Court
of Appeal in this case, including the decision regarding the City's Motion for Rehearing or
for Clarification, this Court's task on remand was to consider whether Ordinance 2006-18,
which substantially amended the City's sign regulations, was properly advertised and
enacted by the City. It is evident from the direction from the Fifth District Court of Appeal
that the limited issue on remand was whether the -ordinance was properly enacted.
2. Ordinance 2006-18 was advertised and adopted pursuant to section
Page 1 _ of 5
166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes. The issue is whether the ordinance should have been
adopted pursuant to the more stringent advertising requirements of section 166.041(3)(c),
Florida Statutes instead. If section 166.041(3)(c) applies, the City was required to hold two
advertised public hearings on the proposed ordinance before the city commission, and to
publish a display ad before each hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. See
§166.041(3)(c)2, Fla. Stat. The City did not do so.
3. According to a plain reading of section 166.041(3)(c), the more stringent
advertising requirements are triggered only if: 1) the ordinance changes the actual list of
permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category, or 2) the ordinance
changes the actual zoning map designation of a parcel or parcels of land. No one has
argued that Ordinance 2006-18 changes the actual zoning map designation of a parcel of
land and it is evident the ordinance does not change the actual zoning map designation
of a parcel of land.
4. Plaintiff argued atthe hearing that Ordinance 2006-18 changes the actual list
of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category; however, Plaintiff
could not extemporaneously identify any zoning category in the City of Winter Springs
where signs are actually listed as permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning
category, nor could Plaintiff identify any use that was once permitted, conditional, or
prohibited before adoption of Ordinance 2006-18 that was somehow changed by
Ordinance 2006-18. Winter Springs has clearly defined zoning categories and, within
those zoning categories, particular uses are listed as permitted, conditional, or prohibited.
Plaintiff did not dispute this. The ordinance changes permitting requirements, construction
standards, and design criteria related to signs.
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5. The Court rejects any suggestion that an ordinance that could possibly affect
one's use and enjoyment of land necessarily falls under the criteria of section
166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes.
6. Plaintiff urged this court to rely on case law he submitted at the hearing
discussing section 166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes before it was amended in 1995. Prior
to 1995, section 166.041(3)(c) set forth a different standard to trigger the more stringent
ordinance advertising requirements. The more stringent advertising applied to ordinances
"which substantially change permitted use categories in zoning districts." As a result of
this previous language, numerous cases, some cited by Plaintiff, found that ordinances
were void ab initio because they somehow affected the use of land. The previous version
of subsection (c) caused confusion as to which enactment procedure applied,
inconsistency in court decisions, and a burden on local governments. As noted in the
legislative staff comments:
Depending on the type of ordinance, however, there are many statutes
dictating very different procedures that must be adhered to by local
governments. One consequence of this significant variety in procedures,
found in various parts of the Florida Statutes, for the enactment of different
kinds of ordinances is a certain amount of confusion by local governing body
officials. This confusion sometimes results in the use of enactment
procedures that are incorrect or should not have been used in a given
instance. The problem is particularly severe in the land use area. Statutory
provisions require that more stringent or extensive notice be afforded to the
public where the object of the ordinance is the rezoning of land. A series of
court cases and statutory amendments have expanded the applicability of
the rezoning ordinance enactment procedures to nearly all ordinances that
somehow affect the use of land. Coupled with a long standing judicial
doctrine that all ordinances that have been enacted improperly are null and
void or are of no effect, a lot of litigation concerns the validity of ordinances
based entirely on the enactment procedure. The courts have declared may
ordinances null and void although they were in effect for years before their
enactment procedures were challenged. This bill is designed to alleviate
these problems.
Page 3 of 5
Final Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement, House of Representatives Committee
on Community Affairs (1 sT ENG/HB 2055), May 16, 1995, pages 10, 11. The bill analysis
further states that one of the primary objectives of the bill was to increase "precision and
clarity" for the adoption of ordinances "by the same general notice procedures except for
ordinances that change the actual zoning designation of a parcel or property or change the
actual list of permitted or conditional or prohibited uses within a zoning category." Id. at 11.
7. This Court agrees with the City that the 1995 change in the statute made
the standard clearer and more precise and that cases referencing or interpreting the
previous version of section 166.041(3)(c) are not relevant in this case as they do not
reference.or interpret the standard currently set forth in the statute.
8. The Court finds that Ordinance 2006-16 does not change the actual list of
permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category in Winter Springs.
Therefore, the City properly advertised and enacted Ordinance2006-18. If the ordinance
affects a zoning category as set forth in section 166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes, that
determination must come from the appellate court. Therefore, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
9. The Order Granting Final Summary Judgment on FirstAmendment, Denying
Motion for Rehearing, and Final Judgment previously granted on December 15, 2006
remains valid and is re -affirmed.
10. The Court enters final judgment in favor of the City. Plaintiff shall take
nothing in this action and the City shall go hence without day.
11. The Court reserves jurisdiction to award the City its costs upon proper
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application.
ORDERED at Sanford, Seminole County, Florida this ? of March, 2008.
Isl ALAN A. DICnY
HONORABLE ALAN A. DICKEY
CIRCUIT JUDGE
copies: Anthony A. Garganese, City Attorney
Debra S. Babb-Nutcher, Esq.
Thomas A. Binford, Pro Se
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